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The current article presents an application of attribution theory to clinical judgment, with 
a focus on the theory’s application to clinical judgments of violence risk assessment. 
While attribution theory has been applied to many diverse fields of human behavior, a 
comparatively limited level of research and discussion has been raised regarding its 
application to the very relevant and practical study of clinical decision making 
(Elbogen, 2002). The current article argues that is not only important for practicing 
clinicians to understand the way in which their client attributes causality to their 
behaviour in order to improve upon the effectiveness of therapeutic interventions, but 
also emphasizes the importance of recognizing and understanding the way in which the 
clinician attributes causality to the clients behaviour, and how this may affect the 
development of suitable therapeutic interventions and risk management plans. Through 
better understanding the effects of attribution on clinical judgments of violence risk 
assessment, it is argued that improvements to the effectiveness of clinical judgments in 
violence risk assessment may be possible. 
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The study of attribution within a clinical decision making setting is both relevant and 
practical. Elbogen (2002) highlights the issue of relevance in researching a process 
that is so often described as flawed (i.e., clinical judgment), and suggests that only 
through further understanding the process, can improvements in researching and 
practicing the process be accomplished. The present article therefore aims to 
discuss the relevance and importance of researching the effects of attribution in 
clinical decision making. Of key interest within the present article is the effects of 
attribution on the formation of judgments and decision making in violence risk 
  




assessment. Attribution has received great attention within psychological research 
since its introduction by Heider (1958), having been applied to a large and varied 
number of areas. For example, research relating to attribution has been applied to 
such diverse areas as: motivations in education, personality, organizational and 
clinical psychology (Weiner, 1985 in Forsterling, 1988). 
 
Heider (1958) proposed that all individuals act as ‘naïve scientists’ when navigating 
their environments, both physically and socially, and that they therefore act not only 
to interpret the physical aspects of their environment, but also the underlying causal 
properties. Based on this interpretation, Heider (1958) referred to individuals as causal 
analysts. With regards to person perception in causal analysis, the perceivers 
manifestation of the object’s (the ‘target’ of the perceivers attention) personality 
and psychological processes are largely based on observed behavior, but may also 
be ascertained through sources such as communication with social sources out with 
the object of perception. It is from this information that a perceptual construction of 
an individual is created. It must also be noted, however, that the perceiver’s own 
mindset (i.e., the way in which the central processes within the brain interact with the 
external information presented) acts to determine the way in which the raw material 
gathered is organized, thus interpreted, by the perceiver. 
 
In accordance with Heider’s (1958) theory of interpersonal relations, it can therefore 
be considered that an individual can infer the characteristics of a person through 
their perception of that person. Perceptions may be obscure in nature (e.g., an 
individual can infer another’s dissatisfaction but not know how they came to obtain 
this knowledge) or may be based on more obvious factors (e.g., ascertaining that 
an individual is displeased based on direct verbal communication to this effect). 
With this in mind, one must be aware of the dangers of inferring a meaning behind 
another’s actions prematurely. For example, in a risk assessment context, since 
perception is argued to be a selective process (Plous, 1993), the clinician must be 
careful not to seek information in line with their initial hypothesis/diagnosis (i.e., 
confirmatory bias), thus selectively perceiving what they had expected to find. 
 
Heider (1958) further discussed the constancy phenomenon in social perception. The 
constancy phenomenon describes the expectation of constancy in a perceived 
object in terms of size, shape, and so on. In the case of person perception this can 
be applied to aspects such as mood and personality, despite the effects of 
changing conditions. 
 
Hammond (1955) previously discussed the effects of constancy on person 
perception in relation to the diagnostic procedures associated with clinical 
  




judgment. Hammond (1955) asserted that while anger when displayed by another is 
an observable state, often an individual cannot communicate the reasoning behind 
how they arrived at this judgment. This is highly relevant in terms of transparency in 
the clinical judgment process. While the clinician aims to discover the motivations 
behind patient, client or offender behaviour, several observable behaviours may be 
apparent in addition to the more subtle internal cues to behavior, as discussed 
earlier. Heider (1958) suggests that in these ‘observer-object’ circumstances, the 
perception of the object and the key observed features remain relatively constant. 
Furthermore, the impressions formed of another person are said to be based largely 
on dispositional characteristics, i.e., those that are perceived to be largely consistent 
in nature. Thus, an individual’s behavior may be judged based on a characteristic 
that is perceived by the observer to be consistent, regardless of inconsistencies in 
behaviour or circumstances. It is this perceived consistency that aids the clinician in 
the assessment of risk and prediction of future behaviour. In line with Heider’s (1958) 
theory, the direct impressions formed of another person remain relatively constant 
over time, despite the level of accuracy/inaccuracy associated with this impression, 
thus aiding the judgments made relating to predictions of future behaviour. 
 
In order to assess the extent to which constancy may affect clinical judgment, the 
way in which individuals attribute underlying causation to an individual’s behaviour 
must be understood. 
 
In general, theories of attribution differentiate between causal factors, both internal 
and external to an individual’s behavior (Forsterling, 1988). That is, where an internal 
attribution is applied to behavior, the individual is considered to be in control or 
responsible for the outcome. Where an external attribution is applied, a situational or 
environmental factor out with the individual’s control is considered to be responsible 
for the outcome. For example, if, in a criminal-behaviour context, an internal 
attribution is applied to an individual, Mr. X, who has committed a theft, one may 
attribute the cause as something relating to or reflecting Mr. X’s personality, thus a 
‘thrill-seeking’ or ‘bad person’ view of Mr. X may result. If, however, an external 
attribution is applied, Mr. X may be seen to be in great need of that which he stole, 
thus he acted out of environmental necessity, and it was therefore his situation that 
drove him to behave in the way that he did. 
 
In 1967, Harold Kelley systematically developed attribution theory, drawing upon the 
work of Heider (1958) and Jones and Davis (1965). Kelley (1967) proposed that 
individuals explain behavior in terms of the person (something about the person 
caused the behaviour), the entity (a constant of the situation was the cause of the 
behaviour), or the time (something relating to a specific occasion caused the 
  




behaviour). It can be seen that the person in this model can be tied to the originally 
proposed internal attribution of behaviour, and that the entity and time can be 
related to the originally proposed external attribution of behaviour. 
 
In addition, Kelley (1967) proposed the concept of consistency in judgments of 
causality, i.e., is an individual’s behaviour and/or aspect of the situation consistently 
present. According to this concept, the way in which we attribute causality to an 
individual’s actions (i.e., was a behavior caused by the person, the entity, or the 
time) will depend on the perceived consistency of the action/situation, in addition to 
the distinctiveness of the behavior across other situations and stimuli and the similarity 
of the action to usual response or social norm. Weiner, Frieze, Kukla, Reed, Rest and 
Rosenbaum (1971) furthered this concept, discussing stable (constant, unchanging) 
and variable (changeable over time and situations) causes to behavior, with 
Rosenbaum (1972) expanding this concept by discussing the importance of differing 
intentional versus unintentional behaviours. To illustrate this concept in terms of 
criminal behaviour, relating back to the previous example of Mr. X, the observer will 
not only consider whether the theft behavior was caused by factors internal or 
external to Mr. X, as discussed previously, but, in the case of external causality, 
according to Kelley (1967), will also consider whether there is a constant in the 
environment (the entity) causing the behavior or if there was a specific trigger on 
that particular occasion (the time) that has caused the behavior. Prior to finalizing 
their judgment, the observer will then, in accordance with Weiner et al. (1971) and 
Rosenbaum (1972), consider whether Mr. X’s actions were stable or changeable and 
whether they were intentional or unintentional. 
 
These causal dimensions are not static, but instead are changeable in meaning 
across different situations and across different individuals’ perceptions of the 
properties of the cause. Forsterling (1988) illustrated this with the example of failure 
attributed to moods. He suggested that if a failure is attributed to poor mood, and 
the mood is believed to be an enduring trait, the individual’s response to this will be 
similar to that triggered by other stable failure attributions, common with enduring 
internal attributions of causality. If, however, the poor mood is considered to be a 
temporary state, the individual’s response will be similar to that brought about by 
external attributions. It can therefore be seen that while attributions of causality and 
the proposed causal dimensions certainly have empirical evidence to support their 
existence, their definitions and the perceived properties contributing to their 
formation are changeable from person to person.  
 
While there are only a relatively small number of studies explicitly investigating the 
effects of attribution on the process of violence risk assessment, research of this 
  




nature would appear to be of great importance within clinical practice. In 1988, 
Forsterling presented an application of attribution theory to clinical psychology. This 
application centred around issues relating to the use of psychotherapy and 
behavioural modification within clinical psychology. The author proposed that in 
diagnostic and theoretical interventions, a clinician may benefit through applying 
attributional analysis. That is, through identifying the way in which an individual client 
ascribes meaning to their behaviours or emotional status, a clinician can then 
develop tailored therapeutic interventions which address not only the individual’s 
needs but that also appeals to their specific belief system, ultimately improving the 
success of the treatment. 
 
However, attribution is not only applicable to the therapeutic aspects of clinical 
settings, but can also be applied to the judgments and decisions made by clinicians. 
Just as it is important for the clinician to identify their clients’ perceptions of causality, 
it would also be of great benefit for the clinician to be aware of their own decision 
making biases. Chen, Froehle and Morran (1997) have shown that trainee counselors 
who are made aware of their use of biases through training sessions designed to 
instruct in attribution processes and practice empathetic perspective display 
significantly lower dispositional bias (i.e., blamed the cause of the presenting 
problems less on internal factors) than those not receiving the training. In light of the 
link between the apparent benefits of applying attribution theory within clinical 
practice, and the evidence to suggest that attributional errors can be effectively 
reduced in a diagnostic setting, albeit not strictly clinical in nature, a background to 
attribution within a clinical judgment setting shall now be discussed. 
 
Plous (1993) discussed the impact of attribution on the treatment recommendations 
made by psychotherapists, suggesting that where a clinician attributes the cause of 
client behavior to be due to situational factors or due to the clients own disposition, 
treatment recommendations may differ. Plous (1993) suggested that when a 
clinician ascribes situational (external) causality, that greater effort is made to alter a 
client’s circumstances. However, where a client’s disposition (internal) is judged to 
be the cause of behaviour, greater effort is placed on altering aspects of the client. 
While this in itself may not appear to be necessarily of negative consequence, Plous 
and Zimbardo (1986) reported low levels of reliability in causal explanations across 
various types of therapy orientations, demonstrating clear implications for client 
treatment. That is, depending on the orientation of their therapist, the root of a 
client’s problems or behaviours may be considered to be internally or externally 
based, and so the type of treatment that they would receive would not be equally 
driven across different types of therapy. 
 
  




In discussing the internal versus external perceptions of behavioural cause, there are 
clear implications for the field of violence risk assessment pertaining to offender 
behaviour. That is, in order for effective treatment planning and risk management to 
occur, the causal factors driving the individual’s problem(s) must be identified. If 
these factors are identified as internal, or controllable, a different reaction to the 
individual may be evoked than if the factors were seen as external. Weiner’s (1986) 
attribution-emotion-action theory proposed that where a negative experience is 
attributed to internal factors, negative emotions, such as blame, will ensue. However, 
when these negative experiences are attributed to factors external to the individual, 
more sympathetic affective responses will ensue. In addition, the way in which cause 
is attributed can effect expectations for future decision making and behavior 
accuracy. Curtis (1994) conducted research investigating the inter-professional role 
conflict experienced in a healthcare setting. Participants were asked to report the 
perceived causes (attributions) for failure (where the individual had compromised on 
a decision) and success (where the individual had supported their argument) in 
terms of their perceived best professional judgment. As could be predicted, success 
was attributed to internal, stable factors and failure was attributed to external, 
uncontrollable factors. Curtis (1994) found that attributing cause to external, 
uncontrollable factors was strongly related to future expectations of failure.  
 
Once again, clear implications for violence risk assessment can be drawn in terms of 
offender management, from both the perspective of the clinician and the offender. 
In relation to the former, should the clinician ascribe an internal cause to the 
offender’s negative life experience or behavior, Weiner’s (1986) attribution-emotion-
action theory would suggest that the clinician would experience blame-type 
emotions towards the offender, which may in turn affect the judgments made about 
the offender’s behavior. If, in line with Curtis’ (1994) findings, this internal causality is 
deemed to be an enduring, stable feature of the offender, the treatment options 
and risk management plan suggested may be different from those recommended 
had the behavior been attributed to an external, unstable cause. This may, of 
course, be suited to the particular treatment/risk management plan being 
developed; for instance, in cases involving psychopathy this could be a very 
important determination of treatment/risk management requirements. However, 
should internal/external causality be prematurely or incorrectly placed, this would 
have clear and perhaps serious implications for the treatment of the offender. 
 
As mentioned, the attribution of causality may not only have implications for clinical 
judgment in a violence risk assessment context, but also for offender judgment. 
Should the offender ascribe an external cause to their negative life experience or 
behavior, Weiner’s (1986) attribution-emotion-action theory would suggest that the 
  




offender will develop emotions to cope with their situation, such as sympathy and 
pity for their own circumstances; emotions protecting the individual from self-
blaming. If, in line with Curtis’ (1994) findings, this external causality is deemed to be 
an enduring, stable feature of the offender, the offender may come to expect 
failure in terms of repeating unwanted behaviours that they perceive to be out with 
their control. This in turn may lead to a sustained, or indeed increased, incidence of 
undesirable behaviour, with the offender over time accepting and explaining their 
negative actions in terms of an external influence driving them or causing them to 
act in such a way, effectively removing blame from their person. 
 
This mirrored conception of internal/external causal attribution between the clinician 
and the offender falls in line with Jones and Nisbett’s (1972) work on actor-observer 
differences in causal explanations for behaviour. That is, the tendency for actors (the 
offender, in this case) to attribute the cause of their actions to situational factors, 
external to them, while observers (in this case the clinician) to attribute cause to the 
same action to stable, internal factors. 
 
While the key focus of the present review has been on the effects of attribution on 
clinical judgments in violence risk assessment, it is fully recognized that judgments 
and decision making in this field is almost certainly affected by other decision 
making heuristics and biases not discussed. It would, however, be impossible to 
address properly all of the possible biases and interactions therein which may affect 
clinical decision making within the scope of this article. Based on the theoretical 
arguments and links presented in the current article, it can be concluded that a 
greater level of empirical research investigating the effects of causal attributions on 
clinical judgment is required in order to not only expand on current decision making 
knowledge in this context, but also to inform and improve the practice of clinical 
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